A game-theoretical modeling of «professor–University» interaction efficiency in conditions of account of negotiation power of the parties

Authors

  • A. A. Shyian
  • S. M. Zlepko
  • V. O. Korniienko

Keywords:

game theory, game in the normalized form, stakelberg’s equilibrium, pure strategies

Abstract

A game-theoretical analysis of influencing of negotiation power at co-operation «professor–University» testifies that in the conditions of modern Ukraine the system of education will degrade, because for professor’s strategy of activity the rational choice will be to «imitation». It is shown that the formal criteria of estimation of professor’s work, which can be applied from the side of University, can not cause change of professor strategy choice. The mechanisms of creation of new public institutes, which lead to the choice both by professor and University the strategy to «work» as the rational choice are discussed.

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Published

2010-11-12

How to Cite

[1]
A. A. Shyian, S. M. Zlepko, and V. O. Korniienko, “A game-theoretical modeling of «professor–University» interaction efficiency in conditions of account of negotiation power of the parties”, Вісник ВПІ, no. 1, pp. 27–30, Nov. 2010.

Issue

No 1 (2008)

Section

Economics, management and ecology

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